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Abstract
In this work, we introduce and study the (α, β)-
Monitoring game on networks. Our game is com-
posed of two parties an attacker and a defender.
The attacker can launch an attack by distributing
a limited number of seeds (i.e., virus) to the net-
work, and/or manipulate the propagation probabil-
ities on a limited number of edges. Under our
(α, β)-Monitoring game, we say an attack is suc-
cessful if and only if the following two conditions
are satisfied: (1) the outbreak/propagation reaches
α individuals, and (2) it has not been detected be-
fore reaching β individuals. On the other end, the
defender’s ultimate goal is to deploy a set of mon-
itors in the network that can minimize attacker’s
success ratio in the worst-case. Our work is built
upon recent work in security games, compared with
stochastic guarantees, our adversarial setting leads
to more robust solutions in practice.
1 Introduction
In this work, we use a network to capture the relationships
and interactions within a group of individuals, e.g., it serves
as the medium for the spread of infectious disease or com-
puter worms. To model diffusion dynamics of an emerging
infectious disease or computer worms within the underly-
ing network, we adopt a simple and intuitive model called
the Independent Cascade Model (IC). This model was origi-
nally proposed in interacting particle systems [Durrett, 1988;
Liggett, 2012] from probability theory, and it has been widely
used to capture the diffusion dynamics in many domains such
as viral marketing.
Due to incomplete knowledge of attackers’ profile and
plan, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to predict their
attacking strategy. Notice that under IC model, the propa-
gation probability on each edge plays an important role in
predicting the diffusion process of an attack. Therefore, the
attacker has strong incentive to manipulate this parameter by
purposely affecting individuals’ interaction preferences, and
hence network structure. In the example of spreading infec-
tious disease, this could be done by creating certain events,
such as a party, to change the frequency and distribution of
individuals’ interactions within a network. Take the spread
of computer worms as another example, the attacker could
send some phishing email to the victim, indicating that suc-
cessfully forwarding a virus-infected file to her friends could
earn her some rewards. This somewhat changes the propa-
gation probabilities between friends. In addition, the skillful
attackers could adjust their strategy according to our current
monitoring strategy. In this work, we assume that an attacker
can launch an attack by (1) distributing a limited number of
seeds to the social network, and/or (2) manipulating the prop-
agation probabilities on a limited number of edges. Take the
spread of computer worms as one example. Our model aims
to capture the most powerful attacker, we can simply set that
adjustable interval to be empty for those weaker attackers. All
these have made it extremely challenging to design a robust
monitoring strategy. On the defender’s side, we are allowed
to select a limited number of individuals as monitors, such
that the attack can be detected as long as at least one of those
monitors have been infected. We aim at designing the optimal
selection of monitors to monitor the outbreak.
In this work, we introduce and study the (α, β)-Monitoring
game. We say a monitoring strategy succeeds if either of the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) the outbreak fails to
reach α individuals, or (2) the outbreak has been detected
before reaching β individuals. The ultimate goal is to find a
monitoring strategy that can maximizes the expected gain in
the worst-case. Our work is built upon recent work in security
games, and we propose using an algorithmic framework of
double-oracle methods to solve our problem.
The main contributions are summarized as follows.
(1) A major contribution of this work is introducing a new
problem, (α, β)-outbreak monitoring, that combines recent
research in security games and in influence maximization.
The framework and method developed in this paper can be
applied to a broad range of domains involving monitoring in-
tentional outbreaks in a network such as cyber malware or
rumor spread.
(2) Drawing from existing studies on security games, we
propose using an algorithmic framework of double-oracle
methods. We propose algorithms for both the defender’s and
the attacker’s oracle problems, which are used iteratively to
provide pure-strategy best responses for both players. We
present NP-hardness proofs for the defender oracle problem,
and propose an approximation algorithm to solve it.
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2 Related Work
Our work is closely related to competitive influence maxi-
mization and rumor blocking [Bharathi et al., 2007; Borodin
et al., 2010; He et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2012; Howard, 2010].
However, our problem is different in three ways: (1) At-
tacker’s primary objective is beyond simply maximizing the
number of infections. It is equally important to avoid being
detected at early stage. (2) Defender’s objective is focusing
on outbreak detection instead of blocking. (3) We consider a
different, possibly the strongest, attacker model. First of all,
we assume that the attacker can select the seeds and manipu-
late the propagation probability on some edges. Most existing
works assume that the attacker can only select a few seeds.
Secondly, we treat the choice of attacker’s strategy as adver-
sarial rather than stochastic. Rather than one-player models,
we are interested in generating equilibrium strategy.
Many existing work in security game focus on domains
that were modeled as graphs [Basilico and Gatti, 2011;
Jain et al., 2011; Halvorson et al., 2009; Haghtalab et al.,
2015]. Another closely related work is [Haghtalab et al.,
2015], their objective is to select a group of monitors that
maximizes the detection probability of an outbreak before it
reaches a target, however they focus on finding a pure strat-
egy without featuring probabilistic components. In addition,
they do not allow the attacker to manipulate the propagation
probabilities. We are the first to study the adversarial out-
break monitoring problem that combines recent research in
security games and in influence maximization.
3 Diffusion Model and Problem Formulation
3.1 Network and Diffusion Model
In this work, we represent the social network using a directed
graph G = (V,E). We use node set V to represent the set
of individuals and edge set E to capture the relationships and
interactions within a group of individuals, and G serves as
the medium for the spread of (infections) disease. To model
diffusion dynamics of an emerging disease within the under-
lying social network, we adopt a simple and intuitive model
called the Independent Cascade Model. The basic IC model
can be roughly described as follows: The entire diffusion pro-
cess starts with an initial set of infected nodes S, called seeds,
which could be intentionally selected by the attacker, and it
unfolds in discrete steps in an randomized manner as follows.
When node v first becomes infected in step t, it has a sin-
gle chance to infect each currently un-infected neighbor w; it
succeeds with a probability pvw, a parameter called propaga-
tion probability. If v succeeds, thenw will become infected in
step t+1, and the process is iterated till no more infections are
possible. In the rest of this paper, let p = {pe|e ∈ E} denote
the propagation probability vector. One natural extension of
this model is called repeated independent cascade model, in
which infected nodes remain active in all subsequent rounds,
i.e., it attempts to infect all its uninfected neighbors in each
round. All results derived in this paper can be extended to
repeated independent model.
3.2 (α, β)-Monitoring Game
We formulate the monitoring problem as a leader-follower
Stackelberg game. The defender (security agencies) acts first
and the attacker (terrorists) observes the defender’s strategy
and then responds to it.
Attacker’s Strategies. We assume that the attacker can
decide the distribution of seeds as well as adjust the propaga-
tion probability on some edges for its own benefit. Since it is
not equally easy to adjust the propagation probabilities on dif-
ferent edges, we introduce the Adjustable Interval model [He
and Kempe, 2014] to capture to what extent this information
can be manipulated on different edges. In particular, the prop-
agation probability on each edge is associated an adjustable
interval, e.g., we use interval Ivw = [lvw, rvw] to present pos-
sible values of pvw that can be chosen by the attacker. The at-
tacker’s pure strategy is composed of two parts, the first part
is to choose up to c1 seeds, and in the second part, the at-
tacker can manipulate the propagation probabilities on up to
c2 edges subject to each one’s adjustable interval. Let Θ de-
note the strategy space of the attacker, thus the attacker’s pure
strategy θ ∈ Θ can be represented as θ , 〈Sθ,pθ〉 where Sθ
is the set of seeds that have been selected under pure strategy
θ, and pθ is the manipulated propagation probability under
pure strategy θ. For ease of presentation, we call the attack
launched under strategy θ as attack θ, and the resulting out-
break as outbreak θ. A mixed attacker strategy is a probability
distribution over pure strategies, i.e., y = {yθ|θ ∈ Θ} with
yθ representing the probability that θ is selected.
Defender’s Strategies. The defender’s pure strategy is to
select up to k monitoring nodes M ∈ M, called monitors,
where M is the defender’s strategy space, composing of all
subsets of nodes with size no more than k. We say an out-
break θ is detected by monitors M if and only if at least one
node from M is infected by that outbreak. A mixed defender
strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies, i.e.,
x = {xM |M ∈ M} with xM representing the probability
that M is selected.
The attacker has two potentially conflicting objectives. On
the one hand, the attacker wants to maximize its impact by
causing a greater spread of infection, on the other hand, it is
equally important for the attacker to minimize the likelihood
to be detected before it reaches that goal. To capture this
tradeoff, we introduce the (α, β)-Monitoring Game, where α
and β are two integers belonging to [1, |V |]. We first define
the α-level outbreak as follows.
Definition 1 (α-level Outbreak) An α-level outbreak is any
outbreak that infects more than α individuals.
α-level measures the maximum impact of an outbreak if it
has not been detected or stopped, a larger α implies a greater
spread of infection. We next formally define the utility model
under (α, β)-Monitoring Game. As in most existing works,
we assume a zero-sum game.
Definition 2 ((α, β)-Monitoring Game) Given both play-
ers’ strategies y and x
• The attacker’s utility is defined as the probability that an
α-level outbreak has been successfully launched and it
has not been detected before reaching β individuals.
• The defender’s utility is defined as the probability that
either the outbreak fails to reach α individuals or it has
been detected before reaching β individuals.
We next briefly discuss two special cases in order to give a
better illustration of our model. The first special case is when
α = 1 . Under this model, the attacker has minimum require-
ment on the impact of the attack, thus it poses even greater
challenge on the defender’s side since the only goal of the at-
tacker is to avoid the detection. As discussed later, one imme-
diate observation is that the attacker will never choose more
than one seed since it can only increase the likelihood to be
detected. Another special case is when β = 1. This setting
again pose the greatest challenge on the defender’s side. Re-
gardless of the value of α, the only way to defeat the attacker
is to detect the outbreak at the very beginning. Typically, we
require that β is smaller than α in order to compensate the
reaction delays after the outbreak has been detected.
Equilibrium. Given both players’ pure strategies θ andM ,
let ρθ(M) denote the utility function of the defender given
both players’ pure strategies θ andM , i.e., the probability that
either the outbreak θ fails to reach α individuals or it has been
detected by M before reaching β individuals.The objective is
to find the mixed strategy x of the defender, corresponding to
a Nash equilibrium of this monitoring game. Given the zero-
sum assumption, i.e., the defender maximizes her minimum
utility, the Stackelberg equilibrium is the same as the max-
imin equilibrium. Thus the optimal mixed defender strategy
x can be computed by solving the following linear program
(LP).
Maximize minθ∈Θ
∑
M∈M xM · ρθ(M)
subject to: {∑
M∈M xM = 1
xM ≥ 0, ∀M ∈M
This LP has |M| variables which could easily be exponen-
tial in the number of nodes, and the attacker strategy space
Θ could be infinite because each edge is associated with a
continuous adjustable interval. In the rest of this paper, we
develop a double oracle based algorithm to solve the above
LP effectively.
4 Double-Oracle Approach
In this section, we present KNIGHT, a double-oracle based
algorithm for solving monitoring games. We also analyze
the computational complexity of determining best responses
for both the defender and the attacker. As subroutines of
KNIGHT, we give the algorithms to compute the optimal or
near-optimal responses for both players.
4.1 Algorithm
The double oracle framework [McMahan et al., 2003] first
computes the equilibrium strategy for a smaller restricted
game and then computes improving strategies for both play-
ers iteratively and eventually converges to a global equilib-
rium. Thus the key challenge reduces to computing the op-
timal or near-optimal responses for both players, which are
called defender oracle and attacker oracle, respectively.
KNIGHT is listed in Algorithm 1.M is the set of defender
strategies generated so far, and Θ is the set of attacker strate-
gies generated so far. CoreLP(M,Θ) computes an equilib-
rium of the two-player zero-sum game consisting of the re-
stricted set of pure strategiesM and Θ, generated so far. The
equilibrium over restricted strategy space can be solved effi-
ciently as the strategy space is small. CoreLP returns (x,y),
which are the current equilibrium mixed strategies for the de-
fender and the attacker overM and Θ, respectively. The de-
fender oracle (DO) generates a defender monitors M that is a
near best response for the defender against y. Notice that M
is selected from all possible monitoring setsM, which is not
restricted to M . The attacker oracle (AO) computes the best
configuration θ against x.
KNIGHT starts with a significantly small set of pure strate-
gies for each player, and then expands these sets iteratively by
applying the AO and DO to the current solution. Convergence
is achieved when no improving strategy can be found for both
players. Assume that both AO and BO can find the best re-
sponse against the other player’s current strategy, the solution
obtained is optimal to the original problem. However, the
above assumption does not hold in this work since it is NP-
hard to find the best response for the defender, we develop an
approximate DO that leads to an near optimal solution to the
original problem.
Algorithm 1 KNIGHT-Double Oracle for Robust Monitoring
1: InitializeM by selecting an arbitrary set of monitors.
2: Initialize Θ by selecting an arbitrary model.
3: repeat
4: (x,y)← CoreLP(M,Θ);
5: M ← DO (yΘ);
6: M =M⋃{M};
7: θ ← AO (xM);
8: Θ = Θ
⋃{θ};
9: until convergence
10: Return (x,y)
CoreLP We first introduce the CoreLP, that is used to com-
pute an equilibrium of the two-player zero-sum game con-
sisting of the restricted set of pure strategiesM and Θ. The
standard formulation for computing a maximin strategy for
the defender in a two-player zero-sum game is listed as fol-
lows.
CoreLP(M,Θ): Maximize x U
subject to:
∑
M∈M xM · ρθ(M) ≥ U, ∀θ ∈ Θ∑
M∈M xM = 1
xM ≥ 0, ∀M ∈M
The dual of CoreLP is listed as follows.
Dual of CoreLP(M,Θ): Minimize y U
subject to:
∑
θ∈Θ yθ · ρθ(M) ≤ U,∀M ∈M∑
θ∈Θ yθ = 1
yθ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ
Recall that ρθ(M) is the probability that either the outbreak
θ fails to reach α individuals or it has been detected by M
before reaching β individuals. If we can estimate the value
of ρθ(M) accurately, then CoreLP can be solved efficiently.
Unfortunately, we next show that calculating the exact value
of ρθ(M) is #P -hard.
Lemma 1 Calculating the exact value of ρθ(M) is #P -hard,
even under the special case when α = 1 and β = |V |.
Proof: We prove this lemma by reducing the influence es-
timation problem to it. The input of a influence estimation
problem is a social network G = (V,E) and a propagation
probability vector p. Given any source node s ∈ V and any
target node t ∈ E, the objective is to calculate the probabil-
ity that t can be influenced or reached by s under IC model.
We convert an arbitrary instance of the influence estimation
problem to an instance of outbreak detection problem by con-
structing an attacker’s strategy as θ , 〈Sθ = {s},pθ = p〉,
i.e., there is only one seed, and a defender’s strategy as
M = {t}, i.e., there is only one monitor. Since we assume
that α = 1 and β = |V |, ρθ(M) is the probability that the
outbreak starting from s can be detected by t. Calculating
ρθ(M) is equivalent to calculating the probability that t can
be influenced or reached by s in the given instance of the in-
fluence estimation problem.. It has been proved in [Chen et
al., 2010] that solving influence estimation problem is #P -
hard, thus calculating the exact value of ρθ(M) is #P -hard.
2
One standard approach to estimate ρθ(M) is using Monte
Carlo simulation, however, running such simulations are ex-
tremely time consuming. Instead, we can leverage a martin-
gale approach developed in [Tang et al., 2015] to estimate
ρθ(M) in near-linear time.
4.2 Defender Oracle
In this section, we describe the design of defender oracle. The
defender oracle problem can be described as follows: gener-
ate the defender pure strategy M (selecting a monitoring set)
that maximizes the defender’s expected utility against a given
attacker mixed strategy y over Θ.
Definition 3 (Influence Maximization Problem) The input
of an influence maximization problem is a social network
G = (V,E) and a propagation probability vector p. The
objective is to select a number k of nodes that maximizes the
expected cascade size.
Lemma 2 The Defender Oracle problem is NP-hard, even
under the special case when α = 1 and β = |V |.
Proof: Reduction from Influence Maximization problem to
Defender Oracle: We convert an arbitrary instance of the
influence maximization problem with social network G and
propagation probability vector p to an instance of the de-
fender oracle problem by constructing the same social net-
work with an reversed propagation probability vector p′, i.e.,
p′uv = pvu ∀u, v ∈ V . We next construct the attacker strategy
space Θ and attacker mixed strategy y over Θ.
Θ = {〈{v},p〉|v ∈ V } and y = {yθ = 1/|V ||θ ∈ Θ}
Under the above setting, the defender oracle problem is to
find a monitoring set M that maximizes
∑
θ∈Θ yθ · ρθ(M) =
1
|V |
∑
θ∈Θ ρθ(M). Since we assume that α = 1 and β = |V |,
ρθ(M) is the probability that the outbreak under θ has been
detected by M . Because Θ = {〈{v},p〉|v ∈ V }, each pure
attacker strategy θ ∈ Θ contains a single seed, say v(θ). To-
gether with the setting that p′uv = pvu ∀u, v ∈ V , we have
ρθ(M) is equivalent to the probability that v(θ) is influenced
by M in the given instance of the influence maximization
problem. Therefore find a monitoring set M that maximizes
1
|V |
∑
θ∈Θ ρθ(M) under p is equivalent to finding a set of k
nodes that maximizes the expected cascade size under p′. 2
Lemma 3 Given a fixed attacker’s pure strategy θ, the de-
fender’s utility function ρθ(M) is submodular.
Proof: We adopt a triggering set based approach introduced
in [Kempe et al., 2003] to prove this lemma. Consider a point
in the diffusion process under seed set Sθ, we can view the
outcome of this random event as being determined by flip-
ping a coin of bias puv . In particular, for each edge (u, v)
in G, a coin of bias puv is flipped at the very beginning of
the diffusion process. The edges for which the coin flip indi-
cated an successful activation are declared to be live inG; the
remaining edges are declared to be blocked in G.
Claim 1 A node u ends up getting infected if and only if there
is a path from Sθ to u consisting entirely of live edges.
Each sample point, say X , in the probability space specifies
one possible set of outcomes for all the coin flips on the edges.
Let ρXθ (M) =
{
1, if the defender wins under X
0, otherwise
. We next
prove that ρXθ (M) is submodular for every X . Consider two
monitoring sets A ⊆ B, if the number of infected nodes un-
der X is smaller than α, then ρXθ (A) = ρ
X
θ (B) = 1. This
is because the attacker fails to reach α nodes, the defender
always win. Thus ∀v ∈ V : ρXθ (A ∪ {v}) − ρXθ (A) =
ρXθ (B ∪ {v})− ρXθ (B) = 0. We next discuss the case when
the number of infected nodes under X is larger than α.
(1) IfA has detected the outbreak before it reaches β nodes,
i.e., some node in A has been infected by Sθ before it reaches
β nodes, then ρXθ (A) = ρ
X
θ (B) = 1. This is becauseA ⊆ B.
Thus ρXθ (A∪ {v})− ρXθ (A) = ρXθ (B ∪ {v})− ρXθ (B) = 0.
(2) If A has not detected the outbreak before it reaches β
nodes, but B does, then ρXθ (A ∪ {v}) − ρXθ (A) ≥ ρXθ (B ∪
{v})− ρXθ (B) = 0.
(3) If neither A nor B have detected the outbreak before it
reaches β nodes, consider the newly added monitor v. If v
can not detect the outbreak before it reaches β nodes either,
then ρXθ (A ∪ {v})− ρXθ (A) = ρXθ (B ∪ {v})− ρXθ (B) = 0.
Otherwise, ρXθ (A∪{v})−ρXθ (A) = ρXθ (B∪{v})−ρXθ (B) =
1.
Therefore ∀v ∈ V : ρXθ (A ∪ {v}) − ρXθ (A) ≥ ρXθ (B ∪
{v})−ρXθ (B), it follows that ρXθ (M) is submodular for every
X . Now we are ready to prove that ρθ(M) is submodular.
Since ρθ(M) can be represented as a linear combination of
ρXθ (M), i.e., ρθ(M) =
∑
X Pr[X] · ρXθ (M), then ρθ(M)
is submodular because the linear combination of submodular
functions is submodular. 2
Lemma 3 together with the fact that the linear combination
of submodular functions is submodular imply the following
lemma.
Lemma 4 Given an attacker’s mixed strategy y, the de-
fender’s utility function
∑
θ∈Θ yθ · ρθ(M) is submodular.
In the following, we propose a simple greedy algorithm (Al-
gorithm 2), which starts with the empty set M0 = ∅, and in
each iteration i, adds the node maximizing the marginal value
to Mi−1 (ties broken arbitrarily):
Mi ⇐= Mi−1 ∪ {arg max
v∈V \Mi−1
∑
θ∈Θ
yθ · ρθ(Mi−1 ∪ {v})}
Algorithm 2 Greedy-based Monitor Set Selection
1: M0 = ∅; i = 1;
2: while i ≤ k do
3: Mi ⇐= Mi−1∪{arg maxv∈V \Mi−1
∑
θ∈Θ yθ ·ρθ(Mi−1∪
{v})}
4: i = i+ 1;
5: end while
6: return M .
A celebrated result by [Nemhauser et al., 1978] proves that
when the objective function is submodular, the greedy algo-
rithm provides a constant approximation to the optimal solu-
tion. Then together with Lemma 4, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 Algorithm 2 provides a (1-1/e)-factor approxi-
mation for the Defender Oracle problem.
4.3 Attacker Oracle
In this section, we describe the design of attacker oracle. The
attacker oracle problem can be described as follows: generate
the attacker pure strategy θ = 〈Sθ,pθ〉 (selecting a seed set
Sθ and a propagation probability vector pθ) that minimizes
the defender’s expected utility against a given defender mixed
strategy x overM.
Since c1 and c2 are assumed to be some constant, we
can enumerate all combinations of seeds and edges in time
O(|V |c1 |E|c2). However, the searching space Θ is still infi-
nite because the adjustable interval of each edge is continu-
ous. To tack this challenge, we next prove that our model can
be reduced to an equivalent discrete space model.
Lemma 5 Under the PI model, given a fixed defender mixed
strategy x, the defender’s expected utility is minimized by
making each pe equal to pe − le or pe + re.
Proof: Pick any edge eˆ and fix the propagation probabili-
ties of the other edges. Consider any defender pure strat-
egy M and attacker pure strategy θ, we define ρθ(M ; γ) as
the defender’s expected utility conditioned on the propaga-
tion probability of eˆ is γ. Let Pr[X|γ] denote the proba-
bility that X happens when the propagation probability of
eˆ is γ. Then ρθ(M ; γ) can be calculated as ρθ(M ; γ) =∑
X Pr[X|γ] · ρXθ (M).
Inspired by [He and Kempe, 2016], let X (resp. X \ X)
denote the set of all blocked (resp. live) edges in X , then the
probability for obtaining X conditioned on γ can be calcu-
lated as:
Pr[X|γ] =
{
(1− γ)∏e∈X\{eˆ}(1− pe)∏e∈X\X pe, if eˆ is blocked in X
γ
∏
e∈X(1− pe)
∏
e∈(X\X)\eˆ pe, if eˆ is live in X
In either case, ρθ(M ; γ) is linear function of γ. Therefore
the defender’s expected utility under mixed strategy x, i.e.,∑
M∈M xM · ρθ(M ; γ), is also a linear function of γ, and
thus minimized at one of the endpoints of the interval. 2
The above lemma shows that we only need to consider
O(|V |c1(2|E|)c2) of possible attacker pure strategies.
What if c1 is large? We next discuss the hardness of the
attacker oracle problem when c1 is large.
Lemma 6 When c1 is unbounded, the Attacker Oracle prob-
lem is NP-hard, even under the special case when β = 1.
Proof: This can be proved through reduction from set cover
problem.
Definition 4 (Set Cover Problem) We can represent an in-
stance of Set Cover as a bipartite graph G = (Va, Vs, E),
where Ve is the set of elements, and Vs is the set of subsets of
Va, and an edge (u, v) ∈ E for u ∈ Va and v ∈ Vs means v
contains u. The problem is to find a subset S ⊆ Vs of mini-
mize size such that all elements in Va are covered.
We convert an arbitrary instance of the influence maximiza-
tion problem with bipartite graph G to an instance of the at-
tacker oracle problem by constructing the social network G
with propagation probability vector defined as follows
p = {pvu = 1, puv = 0|∀(u, v) ∈ E}
In the rest of the proof, we assume that β = 1. Notice that
β = 1 implies that there is no way for the defender to de-
tect the outbreak on time, thus regardless of the deployment
of the monitoring set, the attacker can always win as long as
the outbreak reaches α nodes. Therefore, the attacker oracle
problem is reduced to selecting a set of m seeds that maxi-
mizes the probability of reaching α nodes.
We next prove that given a Set Cover instance, there exists
a solution with size k if and only if there exists a solution of
attacker oracle instance with m = k, α = |Va| + m,β = 1
such that at least α nodes can be reached with probability 1.
Assume the Set Cover instance has a solution with size m.
Then every node in Va must be connected to some of those
m nodes in Vs. Consider the attacker oracle instance, the
attacker can choose those m nodes as seeds to reach at least
α = |Va|+m with probability 1, i.e., the probability that the
outbreak reaches |Va| + m is 1. Conversely, if there exist m
seeds that can infect |Va|+m nodes with probability 1, then
it must be the case that all m seeds are from |Vs| and they can
Figure 1: Performance of the monitoring strategy measured by the expected utility of defender against varying β under different
settings of α and defender budget k.
infect all nodes in Va. It follows that those seeds can serve as
a solution of the Set Cover instance.
To find the optimal solution of the Set Cover instance, we
can solve the attacker oracle instance withm = k, α = |Va|+
m,β = 1 for k = [1, |Vs|], and find the smallest k that can
reach α nodes with probability 1, and corresponding seed set
is an optimal solution of the Set Cover instance. 2
Improved Results when α = 1 We next discuss a special
case of attacker oracle when α = 1. It is interesting to find
that if there is no requirement on the scale of the outbreak,
e.g, α = 1, then the attacker’s objective is reduced to creating
an outbreak that is least likely to be detected. Therefore, it is
always preferable for the attacker to (1) keep the number of
seeds small, and (2) reduce the propagation probabilities of
certain edges to their minimum level. It follows that the at-
tacker’s best strategy is to select only one seed, e.g., c1 = 1,
and reduce the propagation probabilities of c2 edges to their
lower ends. Then the time complexity of enumerating all at-
tacker pure strategies is improved to O(|V ||E|c2).
4.4 Put It All Together
Recall that if both DO and AO can be solved optimally, then
the double oracle algorithm (Algorithm 1) terminates with a
solution which is guaranteed to be optimal. However, The-
orem 1 shows that greedy is an (1 − 1/e)-approximate DO.
We next extend the optimality results to approximate oracles
in the following theorem, the proof is based on Theorem 2 in
[McMahan and Gordon, 2003].
Theorem 2 The Double Oracle approach returns a (1 −
1/e)-approximate mixed monitoring strategy.
5 Empirical Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our monitoring strategy,
we conduct extensive experiments on the Gnutella datasets
[Leskovec and Krevl, 2014]. Gnutella is a peer-to-peer file
sharing network. We simulate attacks and track the outbreaks
on a snapshot of the network, with 8, 114 nodes and 26, 013
edges, where nodes represent hosts in the network topology
and edges represent connections between the hosts. For inde-
pendent cascade model, each edge is assigned a propagation
probability pe randomly selected from [0, 1]. We set le = re
be a constant for each edge ewhile satisfying the condition of
0 ≤ pe− le ≤ pe+re ≤ 1. To obtain the value of ρθ(M), we
leverage a martingale based approach developed in [Tang et
al., 2015] to get an accurate estimation in near-linear time. In
our experiments, the attacker can choose up to c1 = 30 seeds
and manipulate the propagation probability of up to c2 = 50
edges. We vary the value of α, β, and the budget of the de-
fender k, to examine the effect of these parameters on the
quality of our solutions. To obtain statistically sound results,
we run the simulation 1, 000 rounds for each parameter set-
ting, and the average value is reported in the following.
Figure 1 shows the comparison of the expected utility of
the defender under different levels of an attack. Recall that
an α-level outbreak infects more than α individuals without
being controlled. In a particular network, a larger α indicates
a higher chance for the defender to win the game, since the
offender has to infect more individuals to complete the at-
tack. In our experiments, we vary the value of α from 0.1n to
0.25n, where n denotes the number of nodes in the network
and n = 8, 114 for our dataset. As expected, we observe that
the expected utility of the defender increases as α increases.
We also examine the effect of β on the expected utility. As
shown in the figure, the expected utility is increasing with
β. This is because, as β increases, the defender can toler-
ant a larger spread of the attack in the network, leading to a
higher chance of detecting the attack with a specific number
of monitoring nodes. We also observe that as the budget of
the defender k increases from 60 to 100, the expected utility
also increases, for the reason that with a higher budget, more
monitoring nodes can be deployed to detect the attack, which
leads to a higher chance for the defender to win the game.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we introduce and study the (α, β)-Monitoring
game. Our goal is find a mixed monitoring strategy that
maximizes the expected gain from the defender’s side. We
study this problem under adversarial model without know-
ing attacker’s strategy. To tackle this problem, we propose
a novel monitoring strategy based on an algorithmic frame-
work of double-oracle methods. We iteratively produce a sin-
gle player’s best-response to the opponent’s strategy, and add
those strategies to the restricted game for the next iteration.
If both player’s best-responses can be computed in each iter-
ation, then this approach terminates with a solution which is
guaranteed to be optimal. Our adversarial setting leads to a
robust solution in practice. References
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